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Wars can be immensely damaging to economies, and they can leave long-lasting scars on 
society. What are considered to be postwar or postviolence situations can see ongoing nonwar 
political, domestic, and criminal violence, with war economies not ending with the formal 
cessation of hostilities. Unarmed violence can have important effects and even forms of nonviolent 
conflict can carry substantial, measurable economic consequences. Surprisingly little substantive 
economics work on the subject is done particularly work that would deal with the possible paths 
countries can take from crises and there seems to exist an unfortunate lack of understanding among 
economists of the complexities of war and violence and its impact on economy and society, 
leaving a sometimes unrecognized legacy of violence and loss. This essay deals with some of the 
issues involved.  
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   Introduction 
 
In the post-cold war world, the ILO Decent Work agenda had already started questioning the paths 
of development from conflict, asking what were the alternatives to the then-usual prescriptions of 
the World Bank Group and the International Money Fund (e.g., Dunne, 2003; Dunne and Mahone, 
2003). In a comparison of Mozambique and Rwanda, Dunne (2006) argued that the complexities 
encountered meant it was important to consider more precisely what peace meant: Certainly the 
experiences of these countries, or of South Africa, El Salvador, Iraq, and many others, made it 
clear that the end of a state of war did not necessarily amount to peace. 
Wars can be immensely damaging to economies, and they can leave long-lasting scars on 
society. What some consider to be postwar or postviolence situations can be preceded, infused, 
followed, and shadowed by ongoing nonwar political, domestic, and criminal violence. Thus war 
economies often do not end with the formal cessation of hostilities (Cooper, 2006; UNDP, 2008, p. 
11). Successful recovery from collective violence is a difficult path fraught with dangers and 
riddled with economic, socio-cultural, and political problems and concerns. Surprisingly little 
substantive economics work on the subject is doneConly in 2010 did the Journal of Economic 
Literature publish a survey piece on the economics of civil war (Blattman and Miguel, 
2010)Cparticularly work that would deal with the possible paths countries can take from crises 
caused by violent conflict and work about institutions that would make for stable peace and 
minimize the risk of relapse into war or transition into forms of nonwar violence (e.g., Brauer, 
2004; Wennmann, 2010). 
Unarmed violence, e.g., spouse and intimate partner violence, parent-child violence, and elder 
abuse, also can have important effects, for instance on productivity in the workplace and costs 
imposed on the public health care sector that, via tax revenue and public expenditure mechanisms, 
filter through to the levels of fiscal policy and macroeconomics. Even forms of nonviolent conflict 
can carry substantial, measurable economic consequences, as for example in the case of the mostly 
nonviolent protests in Thailand that drastically affect tourist arrivals. 
In general, there seems to exist an unfortunate lack of understanding among economists of the 
complexities of war and violence and its impact on economy and society. The cost of the 2008/9 
world economic and financial crisis, for example, amounted to a world GDP decline of far less 
than one percent in 2009 (IMF, 2010)Cfar, far smaller than the cost that violence imposes (Brauer 
and Dunne, 2011). This lack of understanding has created real problems in the design of 
preconflict-, conflict-, and postconflict policies, leaving a sometimes unrecognized legacy of 
violence and loss. This essay deals with some of the issues involved
1.  
 
   
                                                 
1 Although the present essay makes additional points, for an extensive, and extensively 
documented, version of the baseline argument, see Brauer and Dunne, 2011. 
 Violent collective conflict 
 
The sort of features that can be identified as causing and amplifying conflict and war include 
colonial legacy, military governments and militaristic cultures, ethnic and religious identification, 
unequal development and poverty, bad leadership and/or polity frailties and inadequacies, external 
influences, and the complex of greed, opportunity, feasibility, and the availability of potentially 
lootable natural resources. Very few conflicts are simple; they seldom have single or even few 
causes and will often be a combination of features, moreover combinations that can shift as a 
conflict progresses through time and motivations and incentives for conflict participants change. 
In developed and developing economies the nature of war has undergone changes: There are 
new technologies, changes in war-fighting methods, and the growth in asymmetric conflicts, 
where large forces taken on a challenger who refuses to play by traditional battle rules. Less formal 
armies have acquired increased importance, direct battlefield engagement is less pronounced, and 
the impact of war is more dispersed, and all this comes with an increased involvement of civilians 
as victims (Kaldor, 2001). This has meant that the effects of violent conflict can be pervasive and 
difficult to pin down. 
To measure the impactCthe cost of conflictCone can use two approaches, the accounting 
approach, which tries to work out the total value of asset destruction (physical, human, social 
capital), and the counterfactual approach, which considers deviation from trends or uses 
counterfactuals based on model. Numerous case studies and cross country studies exist, but 
possibly the most useful depiction of the costs of conflict is a graphical representation published by 
the UNDP (Figure 1). Here, GDP per capita for a group of developing states that have experienced 
conflict all are rebased and arranged such that the end of their respective wars occurs in the same 
year (indicated by the vertical line in the Figure). The costs are very clear, with declining GDP per 
capita during war, and rising afterward. But even 15 years after the formal end of hostilities, in a 
number of cases states have not returned to prewar per capita GDP levels (e.g. Nicaragua). 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
[Caption: GDP per capita in selected civil war countries] 
[Source: UNDP, 2008, p. 111] 
 
Adapting a standard approach of empirical growth econometrics, Collier (1999) estimated the 
cost of civil war in terms of the reduction in the rate of economic growth, taking as the dependent 
variable the growth rate during a decade, and introducing the number of months during which the 
country was at civil war as an explanatory variable. Each year of civil war reduces the growth rate 
by around 2.2%, with the sample based mostly on years prior to the end of the cold war. The 
average civil war lasts for around seven years, according to the data set used, so that by the end of 
war the economy is approximately 15% below its counterfactual level. (Other estimates have been 
made from aggregations of case studies, and these tend to propose rather higher growth costs of 
war, but case studies were not selected randomly and there may have been a tendency to select 
particularly costly wars; see de Groot, et al., 2009.) If one assumes that an average, normal state=s 
economy grows by about two percent per person per year, then one interpretation of Collier=s 
finding is that countries in violent conflict are stagnantCall their Anatural@ growth is negated by 
violenceCor that their Aabove normal,@ Acatch-up@ growth is dampened (for example, overtly 
violent India grows at a somewhat lower rate than does not-so-violent China). There are various 
other measures in the literature, both higher and lower. Maybe one should not overstate the impact, but in the case of civil rather than interstate wars the impacts do run deep (Blattman and Miguel, 
2010). In addition, while economies may bounce back they will still have had reduced growth, and 
when this loss of GDP is discounted it implies very high costs (de Groot, et al., 2009). 
Violent conflict in a particular country or region can also have a wider, a spill-over, impact. 
This is obvious for large destructive wars, such as the world wars, but there is also the surprising 
example of Costa Rica, a peaceful country, that has suffered economically from war among its 
neighbors. If one takes the linear trend line, based on real per capita GDP from 1950 to 1980 as 
indicative of how the economy of Costa Rica should be progressed, Figure 2 shows that its 
economy suffered a drastic decline with the onset of the 1980s decade of civil wars in El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, a decline from which Costa Rica has not recovered in the 20 
years since the formal cessation of these wars. 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
[Caption: Cost Rica, real per capita GDP (I$), 1950-2007; base year = 2005] 
[Source: Computed from Penn World Table 6.3] 
 
Studies have looked at these spillovers, through contagion (Murdoch and Sandler, 2002) and 
more specifically through refugee effects (Saleyhan and Gleditsch, 2006). Other studies aim to 
analyze how war affects a particular attribute of economic wellbeing, such as human capital 
effectsCthrough health (casualties civil and military and aftermath) and education (evidence of 
decline in education in conflict)Cthrough effects on inequality, or through the environmental 
consequences of war (Brauer, 2009). One does have to be careful to avoid double counting when 
aggregating, and link these approaches to other approaches. The legacy of these wars cannot be 
measured purely in direct economic costs, but they do give a starting point. Attempts are being 
made to consider the cost of conflict generally and to deal with the issue of double counting 
(Bozzoli, et al., 2008; de Groot, et al., 2009). These costs must reflect the full legacy, particularly 
of civil wars, and include the cost of postconflict violence and reconstruction. 
 
Postwar reconstruction and violence 
 
Violent conflict can have huge economic and social costs which, when combined with the variety 
of causes and forms of conflict, all make moves toward peace rather difficult. Recovery and 
reconstruction is difficult and fraught with the danger of a return to fighting. This has led to 
arguments that the first step of conflict resolution needs to be a detailed understanding of the 
background and dynamics of the conflict (Dunne, 2003). This also raises the question of how 
peace is defined, and different groups are likely to disagree on this. The nature of peace will 
depend on how the war ended, by victory of one side, by international imposition, or by 
exhaustion, and whether it does in fact end completelyCwars seldom end tidily and fighting may 
continue in pockets. It is also possible that a non-peaceful legacy may be left at the Aend@ of the 
war, with different forms of endemic violence. 
Economic reconstruction is vital and may start before the complete end of the violent conflict 
or crisis, as an improving economy would make it easier for all stages of reconstruction to be 
moved through. Whenever it does start, the first actors involved are likely be the aid agencies and 
the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund. It is also likely that, in constructing a 
peace deal, promises were made to deal with certain grievances which may not always be 
consistent with WBG/IMF policies (although both institutions have become more accommodating). To ignore promises made and to impose generic policies for economic growth 
may lead to a reigniting of hostilities as protagonists may see themselves as being better off 
fighting (Harris, 1999; del Castillo, 2008). 
In principle, the end of a violent conflict should lead to a peace dividend, but continued 
military action may be required, even if only to defend the peace. What problems are encountered 
will depend upon the level of development of the country and the damage caused by the conflict. In 
developing countries, demobilizing soldiers is problematic and can take time. If it is done too 
quickly, the country could end up with disaffected and armed ex-soldiers. A war economy faced 
with a sudden change in the form and level of demand will find it difficult to adjust. After a civil 
war the first stage may be to disarm and reintegrate all combatants but this costs money, even as 
fiscal possibilities are likely to be limited. Violent conflict is likely to reduce the capacity of 
economies to absorb labor and may mean increased unemployment. Foreign aid and loans can 
help, but these can cause their own problems such as displacement, dependency, and difficulty to 
serve external debt. 
In addition, it is possible that the postwar environment will see political instability. This is 
likely to discourage investment, especially foreign direct investment. Governments may find it 
difficult to raise taxes or borrow and may be tempted to print money, possibly resulting in 
inflation. It is important for governments to encourage private investors to make investments that 
are irreversible and this requires the rebuilding of civil society and the reestablishment of transport 
infrastructure in particular. Aside form direct destruction, agriculture will be affected by 
destruction of support infrastructure, especially transport and communications networks. It is 
likely that an exodus to urban areas will be taking place and it is important to stop this. The 
break-up of social groups and communities could cause violent conflict with the return of 
ex-combatants who will not be reintegrated. 
In dealing with agriculture it is important to consider both subsistence and commercial 
farming. Subsistence can allow much of the population to become self-sustaining fairly rapidly, 
while commercial agriculture may be the major earner of foreign exchange, so both are important 
in different ways. It is, however, important to recognize the impact violent conflict can have on 
rural household behavior and how this might affect their responses to attempts at reconstruction 
(Brück, 2000). 
In a word, the end of war implies neither economic nor personal security as there may be 
problems of continued micro-insecurity. There could be an environment in which armed 
inhabitants, desensitized to violence, resort to violent crime (e.g., Guatemala). Such insecure 
environments can discourage acquisition of visible assets and so translate into macro-insecurity as 
economic problems get worse. In such situations, there is considerable risk that war will be 
resumed. 
 
Macroeconomics and violence 
 
Ordinarily, economic performance is measured by GDP. But in violent societies especially, GDP 
is an inappropriate measure as it both includes and excludes responses to expected and realized 
insecurity. In South Africa, for instance, there are some 300,000 private guards whose services are 
counted in GDP but have no directly productive function. At the same time, GDP excludes the 
informal markets, the shadow economy, driven underground in response to security failures. It 
cannot be assumed that GDP inclusion and exclusion cancel each other out and, in any case, the 
distributional consequences are different for each. Thus, in societies wracked by violent conflict GDP probably mismeasures the size and structure of an economy even more than usual. 
Violence exerts fiscal effects, both via tax revenue and natural-resource rent losses and via 
higher public expenditure on security forces or the public health sector. It also destroys asset, 
namely losses in productive capital, financial capital flight, and human capital destruction through 
killings and injuring and delays in human capital accumulation. Violence increases transaction 
costs, generating increased contract risk, shorter time-horizons, and the deferral of maintenance of 
public and private infrastructure. A consequent rise of the informal economy and possibly of a 
Acriminal peace economy@ (UNDP, 2008, p. 78) results, and possibly a reallocation of 
development assistance away from violent areas (one of the highest murder rates in the 
worldC60/100,000Caffects humanitarian aid workers), a discouragement of investment on 
account of fear, and investment in security installations (defensive, avoidance, and preventive 
investment) instead of in productivity-enhancing installations. All this can mean a huge security 
economy, but this is neither peace nor, by itself, productive. 
Brauer and Tepper-Marlin (2009) provide a summary review of the literature and, based on 
simulations, suggest that at least 4.4% of 2007 world GDP is misallocated toward security-related 
measures and that the equivalent of an additional 8.7% of 2007 world GDP is simply forgone. This 
translates into about 6.1 trillion purchasing power parity dollars in lost business opportunities. The 
economic benefits of utopian nonviolence (peace) would be large indeed. 
One can identify three objectives for postwar macroeconomic policy. First, to rebuild capital, 
that is, to have income generated from a sound and increasing asset base; second, to rebuild the 
economic, social, and legal framework such that peace is stable and reversal to war unlikely 
(irreversibility); third, to break the prewar conditions inasmuch as they have contributed to war 
and hence to avoid criminalization of the economy. Even the IMF now recognizes that economic 
growth Aat all costs@ is not the correct prescription: growth that sacrifices peace is a mirage. 
As regards monetary policy, inflation control will likely require a rebuilding of the central 
bank as a credible institution, the reestablishment of its regulatory or supervisory functions, and 
the resetting of the domestic and international payments system. A foreign exchange policy will 
need to be developed and implemented and whatever forex-regime is adopted, it will need to be 
reasoned, credible, and flexible as the country=s situation changes. It is also vital that credit 
provision is restarted, especially to small and medium-sized enterprises. 
In a postwar environment, policy coordination is particularly important. In peaceful states, 
fiscal and monetary policy are usually kept apart and can work against each other, but in postwar 
countries, they require close coordination and cooperation (del Castillo, 2008). The consensus 
view is this: Amacroeconomic policies must give priority to minimizing conflict risk, even as they 
promote growth. This may mean tolerating moderate inflation and budget deficits@ (UNDP, 2008, 
p. xxiii). Issues of fiscal federalism (revenue sharing across provinces) are also important, for 
example of natural-resource rents in Indonesia or Nigeria. 
Repatriation of financial, human, and physical capital that may have fled the country or been 
looted during the war and the proper contracting for natural resource exploitation, management of 
the resources, and income flowsCparticularly given that such resources may have been important 
in maintaining the protagonistsCare additional important macroeconomic issues. International 
trade and foreign-aid policy also are problematic: Afree@ trade is frequently not free at all but biased 
toward the interests of developed states, and Aaid@ reflects third-party interests yet needs to be 
nonpolitical, predictable, and long-lasting, on the order of ten years from the end of conflict. 
Clearly, the development of macroeconomic policy in postwar environments is complex and 
requires informed, flexible, and sympathetic policymakersCqualities which are not always apparent. 
 
Economics of violence 
 
Considerable problems hinder any given state moving from the end of war to the development of 
its economy. Many mistakes can and have been made. Often, moving to a postwar process has 
simply been seen as one of regularizing the economy. Unfortunately, this fails to recognize the 
nature of war economies and their inherent logic and that they can be very different from peace 
economies, depending upon the starting point, the nature of the underlying conflict, the process of 
the war, and the final outcome (Stewart, 1993). 
In war situations, the informal economy can often come to the fore. Paradoxically, with the end 
of war, the acquired strength of this sector can then act as a restraint on the reassertion of the 
formal economy and can introduce criminal elements. War can lead to a transfer of assets to 
middlemen, which can be extremely destructive and embed inequality, especially if it results in a 
mere circulation of goods with little new production of assets. And yet, the informal sector may be 
the only viable possibility of a livelihood for many people so that the impact of destroying 
informal economic links through reconstruction policies may not be compensated for by the 
growth of the formal sector (Duffield, 2001). 
When a war ends with the involvement of outside pressure, it is likely that agreements are 
made with protagonists, not with civil society. This can legitimate the leadership of the militias 
who may have been fighting to overthrow legitimate government. If leadership changes take place 
through war, it is not necessarily for the better, though it may be. New governments that come to 
power by violence may not be the best-placed to move to a peaceful societyCfew liberation forces 
have made good post-liberation governments (e.g., Lamb, 2006). 
With or without outside involvement, wars seldom end tidily and residual violence may 
remain, and even when the primary conflict ends fully, there may be a legacy of violence that is 
simply less formal. Certainly many countries considered to be Aat peace@ are in fact suffering from 
various forms of ongoing violence and crime. What the international community calls peace, when 
it accepts a government as legitimate and then withdraws or turns its attention away, may not be 
peace at all. 
Yet without peaceCthe true cessation of violenceCthere will be no development or only 
malformed development where an economy may be criminalized and corrupt. In such a situation 
all but a minority of people are likely to lose. Ultimately, it will be depriving business and its 
suppliers of markets and profits, employees of jobs, customers of goods and services, and the 
public sector of tax revenue while high spending by government on security will put a burden on 
the economy. It may well create an economy where violence is embedded in economic processes 
and a move away from this could require costly and economically disruptive action, which the 
ruling class has no particular incentive to undertake. 
Economists have to realize that the quality of political and institutional arrangements in peace 
agreements matter greatly. First, there is a need to recreate social relations or, as Murshed (2009) 
argues, to recreate a working social contract. This is especially important when Awar after peace@ 
results in a criminalized peace economy. Second, to ensure competent and non-corrupt service 
delivery, both competent macro-planning and micro-delivery are necessary. Third, one needs to 
deal with potentially damaging transboundary effectsCadverse effects on neighbors (e.g., 
refugees, closure of trade routes). This has important implications for aid policy as it might mean 
helping the neighbors as well.  
Conclusions  
 
War exacts a large economic penalty, often on states that can least afford it, and clearly the true 
legacy of war is not fully appreciated or measured. Although used as a fall-back device, GDP is 
actually a bad measure of the cost of violence; we need to do better. Growth of GDP is needed to 
rebuild assets; peace needs to be made irreversible; criminalization is to be avoided. In addition, 
one needs to consider the possible paths of development, of which some may be more palatable 
than others. Fiscal and monetary policy needs to be practical, not dogmatic. 
Traditional state-on-state wars have (mostly) ceased to exist, replaced by civil war and 
(organized) crime. We witness not so much the abolition of violence as a shift in the form violence 
takes. Violence can be devastating for the societies involved, as well as for their neighbors, and can 
lead to huge economic costs. The cost estimates for individual countries are much larger as a share 
of GDP than the world financial and economic crisis of 2008/9 (IMF, 2010). Of course, the 
economic crisis would have been worse if not for massive, coordinated government intervention 
but the question is, why do we not have a similar massive intervention against violence? 
Postwar reconstruction is complex and difficult to achieve and it does not necessarily lead to 
peace. The end of war may leave a governance structure in place that is internationally recognized, 
but it may only be a partial end to the ongoing conflict and/or leave a legacy that maintains 
violence in various forms. The cost of conflict can lead to serious misallocation of resources in 
current GDP, serious opportunity costs of nonrealized GDP, and lost business opportunities whose 
annual value is on the order of several trillion dollars, exceeding the 2008 purchasing-power parity 
measured GDP of all of Sub-Sharan Africa and South Asia combined or of all of Latin America 
and the Caribbean combined (WDI, 2010, p. 34). 
Neither the absence of war nor the presence of security amount to peace. Not only more but 
different research is needed, recognizing the wider issues. Here is an important role for 
economists, but for ones that understand the specificities of dealing with war and postwar 
economies: The social returns to nonviolence and peace loom larger than just about anything else 
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